Dancing with the Elephant and Dragon: Implications for Canadian and Taiwanese Relations

Opinion by Paul Rivett, STMG (Canada) Chair

It seems like a week does not go by without hearing news about another Chinese military test of Taiwanese resolve. The United States continues to overtly support Taiwan as demonstrated by the comments of the US Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, at the Shangri-La Dialogue summit in Singapore this past Saturday. Mr. Hegseth warned of China posing an “imminent” threat to Taiwan. However, it is quite possible that a grand and contrary bargain is being covertly crafted in the halls of Washington and the golf course in Mar-a-Lago.

On the surface, the strategic rivalry between the United States and China has expanded far beyond trade wars—into military posturing, semiconductor supremacy, and global infrastructure investments. Amid this open tension, it is possible that the Trump administration is testing another narrative in diplomatic circles: the U.S. might quietly allow China to attack Taiwan, in exchange for China stepping back from contesting U.S. influence in the Americas, particularly Panama, Venezuela—and even Cuba.

While this abandonment scenario is far from certain, there are ways that Canada can work with Taiwan to foster greater support and cooperation, and it should be begin with the opportunity for increased Taiwanese immigration to Canada.

Taiwan – the Island Dilemma and Cracks in the Silicon Shield

Taiwan has long been the epicenter of U.S.-China strategic competition. With American arms sales, semiconductor cooperation, and a policy of "strategic ambiguity," Taiwan has walked a tightrope on the global stage. But as Washington shifts its strategic focus—especially toward Latin America—Taiwan’s perceived value in the U.S. geopolitical calculus may be changing. If China is willing to concede ground in Panama and Venezuela, would the U.S. turn a blind eye to Chinese aggression in the Taiwan Strait?

Taiwan’s dominance in advanced semiconductor manufacturing, especially by TSMC, has long been seen as a “silicon shield” against invasion. But the United States has been preparing for a future where that shield might crack. Through the CHIPS and Science Act, the U.S. has invested over $52 billion to rebuild US domestic chip production, including funding for TSMC to build chip fabrication facilities in Arizona. This policy shift is widely interpreted as a strategic hedge—a way to reduce dependence on Taiwan in case of a Chinese takeover.

In the event of an actual military action by China against Taiwan, it is not inconceivable that the United States may, particularly if it is believed Taiwan will eventually fall into Chinese hands, take part in actually self-sabotaging Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturing facilities, particularly those facilities manufacturing specialized chips for critical defense capabilities. The US may calculate that it is better for such critical chip manufacturing facilities to be destroyed rather than fall into direct Chinese control.

Panama – the Canal Pinch Point

The Panama Canal, a vital artery connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, has become a flashpoint in this new American-Chinese Cold War. President Trump declared that China had “effectively taken control” of the canal and vowed to “take it back.” China, meanwhile, invested heavily in Panamanian ports and infrastructure as part of its Belt and Road Initiative.

In April 2025, U.S. investment giant BlackRock sought to acquire two major ports in Panama from Hong Kong’s CK Hutchison for $22.8 billion—a move widely seen as a direct counter to China’s regional ambitions. This is still not a done deal.

Venezuela – Critical Resources Gambit

Venezuela, rich in oil and critical metals and minerals, including rare earth, but plagued by political instability, has also become a battleground for influence. China has long supported the Maduro regime through loans and infrastructure projects. But in 2025, the U.S. launched a renewed “Democratic Reconstruction Plan” for Venezuela, strengthening ties with opposition forces and reasserting its presence in the region.

Cuba—The Final Hemispheric Chess Piece

Lastly, Cuba, just 90 miles from Florida, has reemerged as a geopolitical flashpoint. China has reportedly developed signals intelligence (SIGINT) facilities on the island and invested in critical infrastructure, raising alarms in Washington. However, according to Amalia Huot-Marchand in her May 12, 2025 article in The Fulcrum, China may be willing to scale back its presence in Cuba—or at least not obstruct U.S. efforts to reassert influence there—as part of a broader quid pro quo involving Taiwan.

This would mark a dramatic reversal of Cold War dynamics, with the U.S. potentially regaining strategic ground in its own hemisphere while conceding influence in East Asia.

Implications for Canada

While the United States and China engage in high-stakes bargaining over global influence, Canada has emerged as a steady and principled ally for Taiwan. In December 2024, the Canadian Parliament passed a resolution reaffirming support for Taiwan’s right to determine its own future peacefully and called for deeper bilateral cooperation in trade, technology, and democratic governance.

Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy explicitly names Taiwan as a key partner, emphasizing collaboration in areas like semiconductors, public health, counter-disinformation, and supply chain resilience. In 2024, Canada and Taiwan signed a Science, Technology, and Innovation Arrangement, enabling joint research and co-innovation in high-tech sectors.

All of the conditions are in place for Canada to assist Taiwan for our mutual benefit. We need to expand trade to increase Canada’s economic ties and resiliency away from the US. Likewise, Taiwan needs to increase its diplomatic and economic ties and foster greater global support for its continued independence. In order to begin establishing greater common bonds with Taiwan, Canada should immediately offer the same assistance to potential Taiwanese immigrants as has been offered in recent memory to the people of Hong Kong, Vietnam, Syria and most recently Ukraine. Let’s open our doors to greater Taiwanese immigration now, to help prevent a crisis, instead of assisting in the face of a conflagration.

與象和龍共舞：加台關係的啟示

以下為原文中譯摘錄：

幾乎每周都能聽到中國軍方測試台灣底線的新聞。美國方面則繼續公開聲援台灣——正如美國國防部長海格塞斯（Pete Hegseth）於上周六在新加坡「香格里拉對話」會議上所言，他警告中國對台灣構成「迫在眉睫」的威脅。然而，在華盛頓的密室與海湖莊園的高爾夫球場上，也許正在悄悄醞釀一場截然不同的大交易。

表面上，美中之間的戰略競爭早已超越貿易戰，延伸至軍事對峙、半導體爭霸及全球基礎建設投資。在這種公開的張力之中，特朗普政府或正在外交圈內測試一種新的敘事框架：美國或許會默許中國對台動武，以換取中國在美洲——特別是巴拿馬、委內瑞拉甚至古巴——不再挑戰美國影響力的立場。

雖然「放棄台灣」的局面遠未確定，但加拿大可透過與台灣合作，加強更深層的支持與合作，而這應該從增加台灣移民加國的機會開始。

台灣——島嶼困境與「矽盾」裂縫

台灣長期是美中戰略博弈的核心。美國對台軍售、半導體合作、以及「戰略模糊」政策，使台灣在國際舞台上步步為營。隨着華盛頓逐步將戰略重心轉向拉丁美洲，台灣在美國地緣政治盤算中的價值似乎也正發生變化。若中國願意在巴拿馬與委內瑞拉讓步，美國是否會對中國在台灣海峽的軍事行動視而不見？

台灣的半導體優勢，尤其是台積電（TSMC）主導的先進製程，一直被視為對抗入侵的「矽盾」。但美國一直在為這面盾牌可能破裂的未來做準備。透過《晶片與科學法案》(CHIPS and Science Act)，美國投入逾520億元重建本土晶片生產，包括支持台積電在亞里桑那州建廠。這項政策廣泛被視為「戰略對沖」，即若台灣落入中國手中，美國能減少對其依賴。

倘若中國對台發動軍事行動，美國甚至可能考慮「自毀」台灣的半導體設施，尤其是那些負責製造軍事專用晶片的工廠。美國可能會計算，與其讓這些設施落入中國手中，不如摧毀它們，以保護關鍵技術。

巴拿馬——運河之爭

巴拿馬運河連接大西洋與太平洋，是全球重要戰略要道，已成為美中冷戰的新引爆點。特朗普總統曾聲稱中國「實質控制」該運河，並誓言「奪回主導權」。而中國則藉由「一帶一路」大舉投資巴拿馬港口與基建。

2025年4月，美國投資巨頭貝萊德（BlackRock）提出以228億元從香港長江實業（長和母公司）收購兩座巴拿馬主要港口，這被普遍解讀為對抗中國地區野心的重要舉措，但這項交易目前仍未塵埃落定。

委內瑞拉——關鍵資源博弈

擁有豐富石油與稀土等關鍵資源的委內瑞拉，長期處於政治動盪之中，也是中美爭奪影響力的戰場。中國多年來通過貸款與基建支持馬杜羅政權。而美國於2025年重新推出「委內瑞拉民主重建計劃」，強化與反對派的聯繫，從而彰顯其在該地區的存在。

古巴——西半球最後的棋子

古巴，距離佛羅里達州僅90英里，如今再度成為地緣政治熱點。據報道，中國已在當地設立訊號情報（SIGINT）設施並投資基礎設施，引起華府警惕。然而，《The Fulcrum》專欄作家Amalia Huot-Marchand於2025年5月12日撰文指出，中國可能願意減少在古巴的存在，或至少不阻撓美國重建其在該地的影響力，作為一項更大範圍交易中與台灣有關的讓步。

這種局勢可能會形成冷戰以來的重大逆轉：美國在本土地區重新獲得戰略優勢，而同時放棄在東亞的影響力。

對加拿大的啟示

當美中在全球舞台上進行高風險的談判之際，加拿大則成為堅定且有原則的台灣盟友。2024年12月，加拿大國會通過決議，重申支持台灣和平決定自身未來的權利，並呼籲加強雙邊在貿易、科技與民主治理方面的合作。

加拿大的《印太戰略》明確將台灣列為關鍵合作夥伴，強調在半導體、公共衛生、打擊虛假訊息與供應鏈韌性等領域的合作。2024年，加拿大與台灣簽署「科技與創新合作協議」，促進高科技領域的共同研究與創新。

如今，一切條件皆已成熟，加拿大應主動協助台灣，實現雙方共同利益。我們需要擴大與台灣的貿易往來，提升加拿大經濟自主性、減少對美依賴；同樣地，台灣也須深化其全球外交與經濟關係，鞏固國際支持其自主地位。

為建立更緊密的連結，加拿大應立即對潛在台灣移民提供與過去對香港、越南、敘利亞，甚至近期對烏克蘭人民相同等級的援助。讓我們現在就敞開大門，歡迎更多台灣移民，以預防危機於未然，而非等到局勢失控才被動應對。

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