Dancing with the Elephant and Dragon: Implications for Canadian and Taiwanese Relations

Opinion by Paul Rivett, STMG (Canada) Chair

It seems like a week does not go by without hearing news about another Chinese military test of Taiwanese resolve. The United States continues to overtly support Taiwan as demonstrated by the comments of the US Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, at the Shangri-La Dialogue summit in Singapore this past Saturday. Mr. Hegseth warned of China posing an “imminent” threat to Taiwan. However, it is quite possible that a grand and contrary bargain is being covertly crafted in the halls of Washington and the golf course in Mar-a-Lago.

On the surface, the strategic rivalry between the United States and China has expanded far beyond trade wars—into military posturing, semiconductor supremacy, and global infrastructure investments. Amid this open tension, it is possible that the Trump administration is testing another narrative in diplomatic circles: the U.S. might quietly allow China to attack Taiwan, in exchange for China stepping back from contesting U.S. influence in the Americas, particularly Panama, Venezuela—and even Cuba.

While this abandonment scenario is far from certain, there are ways that Canada can work with Taiwan to foster greater support and cooperation, and it should be begin with the opportunity for increased Taiwanese immigration to Canada.

Taiwan – the Island Dilemma and Cracks in the Silicon Shield

Taiwan has long been the epicenter of U.S.-China strategic competition. With American arms sales, semiconductor cooperation, and a policy of "strategic ambiguity," Taiwan has walked a tightrope on the global stage. But as Washington shifts its strategic focus—especially toward Latin America—Taiwan’s perceived value in the U.S. geopolitical calculus may be changing. If China is willing to concede ground in Panama and Venezuela, would the U.S. turn a blind eye to Chinese aggression in the Taiwan Strait?

Taiwan’s dominance in advanced semiconductor manufacturing, especially by TSMC, has long been seen as a “silicon shield” against invasion. But the United States has been preparing for a future where that shield might crack. Through the CHIPS and Science Act, the U.S. has invested over $52 billion to rebuild US domestic chip production, including funding for TSMC to build chip fabrication facilities in Arizona. This policy shift is widely interpreted as a strategic hedge—a way to reduce dependence on Taiwan in case of a Chinese takeover.

In the event of an actual military action by China against Taiwan, it is not inconceivable that the United States may, particularly if it is believed Taiwan will eventually fall into Chinese hands, take part in actually self-sabotaging Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturing facilities, particularly those facilities manufacturing specialized chips for critical defense capabilities. The US may calculate that it is better for such critical chip manufacturing facilities to be destroyed rather than fall into direct Chinese control.

Panama – the Canal Pinch Point

The Panama Canal, a vital artery connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, has become a flashpoint in this new American-Chinese Cold War. President Trump declared that China had “effectively taken control” of the canal and vowed to “take it back.” China, meanwhile, invested heavily in Panamanian ports and infrastructure as part of its Belt and Road Initiative.

In April 2025, U.S. investment giant BlackRock sought to acquire two major ports in Panama from Hong Kong’s CK Hutchison for $22.8 billion—a move widely seen as a direct counter to China’s regional ambitions. This is still not a done deal.

Venezuela – Critical Resources Gambit

Venezuela, rich in oil and critical metals and minerals, including rare earth, but plagued by political instability, has also become a battleground for influence. China has long supported the Maduro regime through loans and infrastructure projects. But in 2025, the U.S. launched a renewed “Democratic Reconstruction Plan” for Venezuela, strengthening ties with opposition forces and reasserting its presence in the region.

Cuba—The Final Hemispheric Chess Piece

Lastly, Cuba, just 90 miles from Florida, has reemerged as a geopolitical flashpoint. China has reportedly developed signals intelligence (SIGINT) facilities on the island and invested in critical infrastructure, raising alarms in Washington. However, according to Amalia Huot-Marchand in her May 12, 2025 article in The Fulcrum, China may be willing to scale back its presence in Cuba—or at least not obstruct U.S. efforts to reassert influence there—as part of a broader quid pro quo involving Taiwan.

This would mark a dramatic reversal of Cold War dynamics, with the U.S. potentially regaining strategic ground in its own hemisphere while conceding influence in East Asia.

Implications for Canada

While the United States and China engage in high-stakes bargaining over global influence, Canada has emerged as a steady and principled ally for Taiwan. In December 2024, the Canadian Parliament passed a resolution reaffirming support for Taiwan’s right to determine its own future peacefully and called for deeper bilateral cooperation in trade, technology, and democratic governance.

Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy explicitly names Taiwan as a key partner, emphasizing collaboration in areas like semiconductors, public health, counter-disinformation, and supply chain resilience. In 2024, Canada and Taiwan signed a Science, Technology, and Innovation Arrangement, enabling joint research and co-innovation in high-tech sectors.

All of the conditions are in place for Canada to assist Taiwan for our mutual benefit. We need to expand trade to increase Canada’s economic ties and resiliency away from the US. Likewise, Taiwan needs to increase its diplomatic and economic ties and foster greater global support for its continued independence. In order to begin establishing greater common bonds with Taiwan, Canada should immediately offer the same assistance to potential Taiwanese immigrants as has been offered in recent memory to the people of Hong Kong, Vietnam, Syria and most recently Ukraine. Let’s open our doors to greater Taiwanese immigration now, to help prevent a crisis, instead of assisting in the face of a conflagration.

与象和龙共舞：加台关系的启示

以下为原文中译摘录：

几乎每周都能听到中国军方测试台湾底线的新闻。美国方面则继续公开声援台湾——正如美国国防部长海格塞斯（Pete Hegseth）于上周六在新加坡“香格里拉对话”会议上所言，他警告中国对台湾构成“迫在眉睫”的威胁。然而，在华盛顿的密室与海湖庄园的高尔夫球场上，也许正在悄悄酝酿一场截然不同的大交易。

表面上，美中之间的战略竞争早已超越贸易战，延伸至军事对峙、半导体争霸及全球基础建设投资。在这种公开的张力之中，特朗普政府或正在外交圈内测试一种新的叙事框架：美国或许会默许中国对台动武，以换取中国在美洲——特别是巴拿马、委内瑞拉甚至古巴——不再挑战美国影响力的立场。

虽然“放弃台湾”的局面远未确定，但加拿大可透过与台湾合作，加强更深层的支持与合作，而这应该从增加台湾移民加国的机会开始。

台湾——岛屿困境与“硅盾”裂缝

台湾长期是美中战略博弈的核心。美国对台军售、半导体合作、以及“战略模糊”政策，使台湾在国际舞台上步步为营。随着华盛顿逐步将战略重心转向拉丁美洲，台湾在美国地缘政治盘算中的价值似乎也正发生变化。若中国愿意在巴拿马与委内瑞拉让步，美国是否会对中国在台湾海峡的军事行动视而不见？

台湾的半导体优势，尤其是台积电（TSMC）主导的先进制程，一直被视为对抗入侵的“硅盾”。但美国一直在为这面盾牌可能破裂的未来做准备。透过《芯片与科学法案》(CHIPS and Science Act)，美国投入逾520亿元重建本土芯片生产，包括支持台积电在亚里桑那州建厂。这项政策广泛被视为“战略对冲”，即若台湾落入中国手中，美国能减少对其依赖。

倘若中国对台发动军事行动，美国甚至可能考虑“自毁”台湾的半导体设施，尤其是那些负责制造军事专用芯片的工厂。美国可能会计算，与其让这些设施落入中国手中，不如摧毁它们，以保护关键技术。

巴拿马——运河之争

巴拿马运河连接大西洋与太平洋，是全球重要战略要道，已成为美中冷战的新引爆点。特朗普总统曾声称中国“实质控制”该运河，并誓言“夺回主导权”。而中国则借由“一带一路”大举投资巴拿马港口与基建。

2025年4月，美国投资巨头贝莱德（BlackRock）提出以228亿元从香港长江实业（长和母公司）收购两座巴拿马主要港口，这被普遍解读为对抗中国地区野心的重要举措，但这项交易目前仍未尘埃落定。

委内瑞拉——关键资源博弈

拥有丰富石油与稀土等关键资源的委内瑞拉，长期处于政治动荡之中，也是中美争夺影响力的战场。中国多年来通过贷款与基建支持马杜罗政权。而美国于2025年重新推出“委内瑞拉民主重建计划”，强化与反对派的联系，从而彰显其在该地区的存在。

古巴——西半球最后的棋子

古巴，距离佛罗里达州仅90英里，如今再度成为地缘政治热点。据报道，中国已在当地设立讯号情报（SIGINT）设施并投资基础设施，引起华府警惕。然而，《The Fulcrum》专栏作家Amalia Huot-Marchand于2025年5月12日撰文指出，中国可能愿意减少在古巴的存在，或至少不阻挠美国重建其在该地的影响力，作为一项更大范围交易中与台湾有关的让步。

这种局势可能会形成冷战以来的重大逆转：美国在本土地区重新获得战略优势，而同时放弃在东亚的影响力。

对加拿大的启示

当美中在全球舞台上进行高风险的谈判之际，加拿大则成为坚定且有原则的台湾盟友。2024年12月，加拿大国会通过决议，重申支持台湾和平决定自身未来的权利，并呼吁加强双边在贸易、科技与民主治理方面的合作。

加拿大的《印太战略》明确将台湾列为关键合作伙伴，强调在半导体、公共卫生、打击虚假讯息与供应链韧性等领域的合作。2024年，加拿大与台湾签署“科技与创新合作协议”，促进高科技领域的共同研究与创新。

如今，一切条件皆已成熟，加拿大应主动协助台湾，实现双方共同利益。我们需要扩大与台湾的贸易往来，提升加拿大经济自主性、减少对美依赖；同样地，台湾也须深化其全球外交与经济关系，巩固国际支持其自主地位。

为建立更紧密的连结，加拿大应立即对潜在台湾移民提供与过去对香港、越南、叙利亚，甚至近期对乌克兰人民相同等级的援助。让我们现在就敞开大门，欢迎更多台湾移民，以预防危机于未然，而非等到局势失控才被动应对。

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